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Excerpts from "The Future of American Sentencing: A
National Roundtable on Blakely"
INTRODUCTION
The law of sentencing in the United States was transformed on June 24, 2004,
when the Supreme Court imported into sentencing law a dramatic new reading of
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Judges, legislators, sentencing
commissioners, criminal lawyers, and legal scholars began the vexing task of
imagining the implications of Blakely v. Washington.1 In the midst of this national
reconsideration of American sentencing, Stanford Law School was fortunate to
host an assemblage of some of the most distinguished sentencing experts in the
United States for a public conversation on Blakely. This "National Roundtable"
was held on October 7 and 8, 2004, by happy coincidence the very week that the
Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States v. Booker' and United States
v. Fanfan,3 the cases by which the Court had accepted the challenge it imposed
upon itself in Blakely-to clarify Blakely's effect on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. The virtually unanimous consensus at the Roundtable-that the Court
would extend Blakely to the federal system-has now been bome out in the Booker
decision.
The Roundtable participants, of course, addressed the technical implications
of the new Sixth Amendment, including the possible constitutional remedies for
Sixth Amendment violations at sentencing, while also projecting the wide variety
of possible congressional responses. But the Roundtable also addressed deeper
and broader questions arising from these cases-such as the intellectual origins
and jurisprudential significance of Blakely's reading of the Sixth Amendment; the
effects of Blakely on the widely varied and often highly innovative sentencing
schemes that have emerged in the states during the last two decades while so much
attention has been focused on the federal guidelines; and the more speculative
implications of this new doctrine for the general philosophies and goals of modem
American sentencing reform. We have excerpted key parts of the proceedings of
the Roundtable dealing with these questions, and we are grateful that the Ohio
State Journal of Criminal Law has opened its pages for us.
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
2 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
3 ,-
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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF BLAKELY-ROOTS AND IMPLICATIONS
In Blakely, the Supreme Court extended the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey4
and held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial can be violated even by a
sentence below what has historically been considered the statutory maximum.
Now, under Blakely, "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.",5 As we ponder the implications for
state and federal sentencing schemes, one can pause and ask how we got here. Is a
retooling of the line between "crimes" and "sentencing facts" inconsistent with
originalist notions and the history of the Sixth Amendment? Was Blakely indeed
an unforeseeable event, or can we find significant foreshadowings in such cases as
In re Winship6 and Mullaney v. Wilbur?7 Did these cases demand a "substantive"
change in criminal law, or did they invite merely formalistic ones? Will the states
and Congress be able to accommodate Blakely and Booker through formalistic re-
drafting of their sentencing guidelines? Or is Blakely one last opportunity to
deploy constitutional law to determine the constitutional and constitutive
requirements of a true criminal law?
Ronald Allen: The precursor to the Apprendi problem is Winship, Mullaney,
Patterson,8 Sandstrom,9 Ulster,1 ° Martin,1 all those cases. And interestingly, the
problem is, I think, similar, if not identical to what it is now, and that is, what's the
constitutional interest in the substantive criminal law? Then the focus was
exclusively on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which has an interesting
implication, rather than on that standard coupled with trial by jury. But I think the
conceptual problems really were identical. In 1977 I was struggling with
Mullaney, which I thought had to be wrong, and I wrote this following sentence:
4 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt").
5 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
6 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (announcing the "requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt").
7 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (finding unconstitutional a Maine statute that shifted to the defendant
the burden of proving a mens rea lower than malice aforethought).
8 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (upholding a New York statute that shifted to
the defendant the burden of proving extreme emotional disturbance).
9 Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (finding unconstitutional lower court jury
instructions that relieved Montana of the burden of proving the defendant's mens rea).
10 County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979) (upholding New York trial
court jury instructions allowing-but not requiring-the jury to assume that the presence of a firearm
in an automobile is evidence of its possession by each of the automobile's occupants).
'1 Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (upholding an Ohio statutory scheme in which the
defendant had the burden of proving self-defense).
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"Of other theories that have been advanced to explain the 'enigmatic decision' in
Wilbur, only one merits serious attention: If a state specifically deems a fact
relevant to a sentence, then the prosecution must prove that fact beyond a
reasonable doubt." I then spent the rest of the article explaining why that was
wrong. Well, and interestingly, the Supreme Court of the United States cited to
those passages in Patterson v. New York when it cut back on Mullaney v. Wilbur.
In any event, while the roots of today's problem lie in these cases in the mid-70s,
my interest in those cases turned out to be in their epistemological aspects rather
than their implications for the criminal justice process. I have spent most of the
last few days examining questions of formal reasoning and the relationship to
common sense and so on, so I want to say two things. I think that Blakely is
wrong, but not because I think the Sentencing Guidelines are a good thing or
anything of that sort. Maybe the Sentencing Guidelines are a misshapen, ill-
begotten creature that deserves to be put out of its misery. Maybe they're the best
thing since sliced bread. So, given all these qualifications, what can I do? I can do
two things. Number one, I think I can actually explain how we got from the mid-
70s to Apprendi and Blakely through the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. And the
way we got there has some interesting implications for the conceptual issue that I
think really dominates that problem. And then secondly, I hope to provide what I
call an external stance on some of the questions you'll be discussing, and in
particular to remind you of the sort of checkered past that the Court has had in its
forays into the substantive criminal law.
First, the ideology: Mullaney did, in a sense, exactly what Blakely did. It
picked and chose a few passages from Winship, took them out of context, applied
them in a completely different context, examined their logical implications, and
more or less went with it, with the result that that would have caused a reworking
of a substantial portion of the then-existing substantive criminal law. Interestingly,
Patterson saw this, and chose not to go down that path. Many of us at the time
were urging it not to go down that path by articulating what the constitutional
interest in the substantive criminal law is, and by providing the means of a rational
ordering of things like proof beyond reasonable doubt and I think, actually, jury
trial as well. But the Court instead didn't. Jeffries and Stephan at Virginia were
making arguments along these lines. I had made the argument that proportionality
is the proper test to apply. If something, in fact, was necessary for the sentence
given an Eighth Amendment proportionality requirement, then it had to meet all
the panoply of procedural rights. The Stephan-Jeffries argument was that there is
this constitutional interest in the structure of the common law form of criminality
that ought to be preserved.12 The Court accepted the argument that there had to be
a constraint-that was Patterson-but what they did would seem to articulate an
elements test, that an element is what the legislature says it is and that's more or
less the end of the story. And that's what distinguished, although it's the height of
12 See John C. Jeffries & Paul B. Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in
Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979).
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formalism, Patterson v. New York. That's what they said to get themselves out of
a box. There's a second line that came out of Winship that also contributes to the
structuring and the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines, and also has an
interesting implication today. The second line dealt with the various evidentiary
devices that actually in many respects are analogous to affirmative defenses. This
is the line that went through Sandstrom v. Montana and Ulster County Court.
Those cases did the same thing. Sandstrom took a few passages from pre-existing
cases applied in a way that would have again required substantial re-working of
aspects of the criminal law. Ulster, basically, was a highly analogous case, saw
this, and again curtailed it, and said, "No, we're not going to do that." Here again
the reason, and the way in which they did it, was basically through formal
distinctions. So by the time you get done with this line of cases, what you have is
a strong vindication of formality.
The conceptual problem is that sentencing is a continuous variable-from
zero to life-that it seems, the Court has said, sheds light on or is triggered by or
initiates constitutional interests. Now you have two options. You can treat it as a
continuous variable-that's what the Court did in Mullaney, in Sandstrom, and
now in Blakely--if you're at any stage in that variable, the constitutional rights are
initiated. In all three cases, that's how it was thought of. Or, you can ignore the
continuous nature of it, and look for a way not to treat it in that fashion. Then you
have two choices. Either you construct a sort of formal argument, a distinction
without a difference, to simply curtail it. That's what the Court did in Patterson
and Ulster. Or you can do what the commentators were arguing for back then,
which is come up with a substantive argument that explains why there is a limit on
this particular continuous variable.
Blakely seems exactly a rerun of this, in a slightly different context and with
exactly the same problems. That's also why I think Blakely is a mistake. Now
return to this point that there are two lines leading out of Winship, not one. The
second line has to do with all these other evidentiary devices. Now, maybe the
Court will de-couple the proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement from the
jury trial requirement. If they don't they have a real problem. There is no question
that, all the way back into common law, burdens could be placed on defendants.
Here is what Blackstone wrote in 1762: "All [these] circumstances of justification,
excuse or alleviation" are rested on the defendant.' 3 It's not peculiar to the law of
homicide, but prevails in all of the departments of criminal law. So, if you don't
separate those two, which you might, you have a problem. You have an even
deeper problem. All three branches of the government, the executive, the
legislature, and the judiciary, have their hands all over the inferential process at
trial. Inferences, presumptions are examples, comments on the evidence in states
that allow it are examples, but more deeply than that, questions of admissibility. If
you control what evidence is heard, you can control the outcome. So all over the
13 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 201 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1979) (1769).
2005]
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
criminal trial are the hands of the other branches of government: The executive in
determining what evidence to offer, the legislature in providing rules of
admissibility/exclusion and the like, the judiciary and their choices, discrete
choices. So the idea that you can idealize the criminal jury and it's going to decide
in this sort of Kantian fashion, proof beyond reasonable doubt, unconstrained by
the awful influence of government-that's just a non-starter. Now, how do you
cabin that off? Well there's only one way to cabin it off. It's just like I said
before, you either have to come up with a formal argument that distinguishes it
(formal meaning distinction without a difference), or you have to come up with a
substantive theory.
And it turns out there is a substantive theory about that, it's the Eighth
Amendment. So, if facts are necessary given what the sentence is, or given the
maximum sentence a person's exposed to, then that fact has to be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and I would have said, if asked, jury trial and everything else, as
well. But that, working within the constraints of the Eighth Amendment, that
means the legislature could eliminate that fact, just as they can today. If they can
eliminate that fact, it's very hard to see how a defendant's constitutional interest is
compromised by instead requiring proof by preponderance or some lower standard.
Michael Dreeben: The rule that the Court had come up with in Mullaney, in an
effort to protect the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, was a very
indeterminate rule. The Court came to perceive that Mullaney would wipe out a
lot of valuable legislative innovation if it meant that any fact that increased a
defendant's exposure to punishment had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
And the Court picked up on that theme in Patterson when it limited the Mullaney
rule. Patterson pointed out that a broad reading of Mullaney might hinder reform
of the felony murder rule or statutory rape laws. The Court said, "We don't want
to be interfering that much with legislative prerogatives." The result in Patterson
is a totally formal rule that gives almost no protection to defendants against a
legislature bent on circumventing the jury trial right or diluting the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt requirement. And for many years that's exactly where the
equilibrium fell. A lot of things happened in the world of sentencing between
Patterson and Apprendi, including the advent of the Sentencing Guidelines. How
much of that ended up fueling Apprendi itself is hard to say. But what is
remarkable and ironic about Apprendi is that the Court pretty much turned the
tables on Patterson by adopting a formal rule for the purpose of protecting the jury
trial right. And by announcing a formal rule, Apprendi achieved what Mullaney
had failed to do, namely, offering some definable protection to a defendant's jury
trial right, without calling into doubt all legislative innovations in sentencing law.
Now, Blakely, I think, missed an opportunity. The Court could have elected not to
extend Apprendi to the Washington state system. It could have said, "What
Washington has done is to co-opt the discretionary sentencing power, that was
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available under Williams v. New York, 14 for a judge to do anything he wanted to
do, and cabined and guided that discretion, but preserved enough of it so that the
fact that the judge could go up above the presumptive guidelines without raising
the 'statutory maximum' term." But the Court didn't go down that road.
I will now offer a very simplified critique of Blakely that suggests that it's not
actually about what it seems to be about. What it seems to be about is limiting
hostile legislatures that want to circumvent the "circuit breaker" in our machinery
of justice, the jury, by assigning determinations that will affect the defendant's
sentence to a judge. That's what Blakely is about on the surface. But, I argue that
it's not really about that at all. First of all, it's not really about protecting the jury,
because, if the legislature wants to, it can set the sentence for kidnapping from zero
to ten years, and the judge can then make any findings he wants within that range,
without submitting the issues to a jury. If that system is consistent with Blakely,
and Blakely is about protecting the jury trial, then it's a very strange rule, because
it allows legislatures to get out of jury trials altogether on sentencing factors just by
eliminating guidance to the sentencing judge. The other possibility is that Blakely
is aimed at legislatures. On that theory, Blakely seeks to have legislatures respect
the jury trial right by providing a meaningful check on attempts to limit the
sentencing judge's discretion without using the jury as a factfinder. But Blakely
can't possibly be about that either because, given its formal nature, and given cases
like Harris v. United States' 5 and Patterson v. New York, the first upholding
mandatory minimums sentences, the second upholding affirmative defenses, any
legislature that's bent on evading the jury trial guarantee has a plethora of options
open to it.
So, if Blakely is really not about what it says it's about on the surface, what is
it about? I would submit that Blakely's formalism is really about Justice Scalia's
view of constitutional interpretation. Justice Scalia prefers tests that are grounded
in constitutional text, bright-line rules, history and other ways of deciding a case
that do not require judges to do much subjective thinking about the way the
Constitution works. He announced that pretty clearly in Blakely itself, praising the
decision as announcing a bright-line rule.
But why hold Justice Scalia responsible, when he is just one of five votes? I
give him extra credit because of history. He originated the rule that became
Blakely virtually out of nothing, in his separate opinion in Almendarez-Torrez. 16
Even more significantly, Justice Scalia defected from his other four colleagues in
Harris v. United States, and said that Apprendi does not apply to mandatory
14 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (holding that the Due Process Clause did not prohibit the trial court
from considering a probation report prepared on defendant even though defendant had no opportunity
to disprove aspects of the report).
15 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (holding that Apprendi does not require jury to find fact that increases
mandatory minimum sentence).
16 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (holding that statute may allow
for an increase in the maximum punishment based on a judicial finding of a prior conviction).
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minimums, thereby opening up one of the most obvious ways of evading Blakely.
That suggests that the Court's Blakely jurisprudence, considered as a whole, is not
as much about what happens to defendants in actual criminal cases, as it is about
establishing a particular style of constitutional interpretation.
Rory Little: What is the underlying theory of constitutional interpretation in
Blakely? How do you interpret the text of the Constitution in order to reach certain
results when the language doesn't quite speak to it? I had the ignominious
distinction of filing a petition for re-hearing in the Blakely case, in which I argued
that history doesn't answer this question. I think Justice Scalia has actually
conceded as much, although he would never say so in print. Justice Scalia's
position is that of a constitutional originalist, but he does not stick to all the
evidence that might be looked to in that inquiry, at least in the Blakely context, and
he's much more interested in what the common law might say in addition to his
own evolving notions.
First, has the Supreme Court ruled that the legislature may not give precise
directions (not advice, but binding directions) to criminal sentencing judges about
how to sentence within legislative statutory ranges? The answer is no, not entirely.
The Blakely Court majority stressed that its constitutional ruling was entirely
procedural, not substantive. So long as it is a jury and not a judge that finds the
facts, legislatures may continue to give sentencing judges precise directions as to
how these facts must be weighed, or weighted, in the sentencing balance. So I
don't believe the Court intends to re-define, or has re-defined, what an element is,
for constitutional purposes. They've used the analogy of element to get to the
constitutional process implications of their analysis, but I don't believe they're re-
defining elements. The consequences of an element are, of course, three: fair
advance notice, proof beyond reasonable doubt, and found by a jury. But people
need to remember the Winship Court actually never used the word "element." It
said every fact necessary to constitute a crime. Blakely and Apprendi still leave the
legislature full authority to define crimes and authorize statutory maximums within
which judges may sentence, and that kidnapping can remain kidnapping in
Washington State, even if Washington State gets rid of the aggravating factor of
deliberate cruelty as a binding precise direction. Furthermore, if Washington State
does what Kansas did and allows juries to find that fact, judges can still be given
the discretion over what to do with the fact. It doesn't require the jury sentence; it
only requires that they find facts. Apprendi is very different in this sense, in that
the New Jersey statutory structure clearly did define a new crime, when it said,
"Possession of a gun, capped at ten years, can become possession of a gun with
racial bias, capped at twenty years." That is a very easily distinguished set of
legislative decisions. For example, Blakely would not be acquitted of kidnapping,
even if you gave the jury the job of finding facts on deliberate cruelty. If the jury
were to find that he committed the elements of kidnapping, but without deliberate
cruelty, he would not be acquitted. An element is a basic structural unit of a crime:
it is not an element to find an aggravating factor which may or may not aggravate a
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sentence. And it seems to me Blakely is purely a Sixth Amendment jury trial
decision. This is why Justice Scalia stresses for the majority at the end of Blakely
that the decision reflects the need to give intelligible content to the right of the jury
trial.
I'll suggest there are three camps of constitutional interpretive theorists over
the course of the last forty-five, fifty years, which is when criminal procedure
actually developed as a constitutional area in this country. First, you have
constitutional originalists; these are familiar to us today (though they weren't so
familiar until Justice Scalia got appointed), but these are believers in history. That
the Framers in 1789 were governed, if you will, by a common law understanding
when they wrote the text, and so the text, when it isn't plain, must be interpreted in
light of their common law understandings. It's undeniable that in Apprendi the
Court was wrong about its history. In Apprendi, the Court spent six pages saying
the Framers were not familiar with indeterminate sentencing. They were familiar
with fixed-term sentencing. There's some quotation of Blackstone, who was
discussing English common law, and some state cases, but if you look at what they
did, the Framers, the same people who wrote the Sixth Amendment, at the same
time they were writing it (when they wrote the first federal crime bill), they wrote
provisions that were indeterminate sentencing ranges. They wrote a dozen crimes,
for which they said the penalty shall be imprisonment not to exceed three years,
seven years, ten years. They were progressive sentencing reformers. They were
leaving the fixed-term era and leading, if you will, into indeterminate sentencing.
Whether you believe that at the same time they wrote indeterminate sentencing
ranges, they would have believed that a legislative direction on how to sentence
within the range would violate the right to jury trial, which they wrote at the exact
same time-there's no evidence to support any particular result there. But to
ignore that fact in Apprendi, and then to simply say in Blakely, "We considered
these authorities and we don't need to repeat them here," is mistaken, particularly
when the issue in Blakely was within-range sentencing, which they distinguished
after they gave their wrong view of history in Apprendi. They immediately said,
"Of course, we're not dealing here with within-range sentences." That's why
every circuit decided to say that, after Apprendi and after Ring,'7 that within-range
sentencing guidelines were fine. So any textual interpretation in history doesn't do
it.
You have two other ways of interpreting the Constitution in regard to criminal
law. One is represented by Miranda,8 and I use that because of the extreme nature
of its theory. This is a theory that allows the Constitution to be interpreted
broadly, and allows the Court to structure rules to protect constitutional rights.
17 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (finding unconstitutional an Arizona statutory
scheme granting a judge the ability to impose the death sentence upon a defendant only after finding
facts additional to those found by the jury).
18 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that a suspect must receive certain
warnings prior to custodial interrogation in order to protect Fifth Amendment rights).
2005]
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And of course Justice Scalia has been a huge critic of Miranda. He doesn't see
himself in that camp. He says there's no constitutional support for the Miranda
result in his Dickerson19 dissent.
The third way of interpreting constitutional language might be called,
"Evolving Constitutional Standards." This is represented most dramatically by the
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. The idea that Justice
Brennan would have subscribed to, that the text is not immutable, and that what the
Framers thought is not the steady-state nature of the game, that it may evolve over
time to address our evolving notions.
And I suggest that the triumphant architect in the Blakely-Apprendi line of
cases is not Justice Scalia; it's Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens in 1984 wrote a
dissenting opinion in a case called Spaziano v. Florida,° in which he wrote an
opinion on the jury's role in sentencing, and the need for the jury to be the
sentencer, to have a morally acceptable system of sentencing. His remarks were
limited to the capital context, but the similarities between what he said about the
role of the jury and what Justice Scalia says at the end of Blakely are uncanny.
They're eerily similar in the importance of the role, and the importance of that role
to structural beliefs that we have culturally in this society. The genius of Blakely is
that Justice Stevens found a way to get the constitutional originalists to come with
him in this enterprise. The genius of Blakely is that Justice Stevens quietly
allowed his idea to percolate, and yet, if you will, allowed the constitutional history
to be written in a way so that Justice Scalia and late, but not too late, Justice
Thomas [would] come to the table and join him. And remember that Justice
Stevens's dissent was assigned to him by the senior Justice on the Supreme Court
at that time in 1984, Justice Brennan. So I actually think Justice Brennan is
smiling as he watches this conference.
Albert Alschuler: Well, here's a thought experiment. What if the issue in Blakely
had originated thirty years ago in a small western state? Imagine that in the early
1970s a new designer drug, Wham-Smack, appeared on the scene. Most states
responded by punishing the possession of this drug in the same way they punished
other crimes, by giving broad sentencing discretion to both judges and parole
boards. The state of Montoming, however, tried something new. The Montoming
statute declared the possession of five or more grams of Wham-Smack a felony
punishable by no more than twenty years. That was like all the other states. But
then, the Montoming statute added some further provisions. If the offender
possessed only five grams, his sentence would be five years. If the judge found, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the offender had possessed ten additional
grams at any time within six months of his crime, the sentence would be raised to
ten years. Moreover, if the judge found that the offender's supplier had twenty
19 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming the Miranda decision).
20 468 U.S. 447 (1984) (holding that a death sentence imposed by trial judge following a jury
recommendation of life imprisonment did not violate the Constitution).
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grams of Wham-Smack in his hat, the offender's sentence would become fifteen
years. Sam Wham, who was sentenced to fifteen years under the Montoming
statute, argued before the Supreme Court that the state's sentencing procedures
were unconstitutional. He claimed that Montoming was punishing him for a crime
other than the one for which he had been convicted. The state hadn't given him a
jury trial on the additional charges, and had not found him guilty of those charges
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Montoming prosecutor insisted that Sam was
being punished only for possessing five grams of Wham-Smack. His fifteen-year
sentence did not exceed the twenty-year maximum the legislature had authorized
for this crime. The fact that Sam possessed ten grams six months ago, and his
supplier had twenty grams in his hat, were sentencing factors, not elements of
other uncharged crimes. On June 24, 1974, the Supreme Court ruled in Sam's
favor, five to four.
Obviously, Wham v. Montoming would have made only a tiny blip in the
radar screen compared to the one Blakely v. Washington made this year. Whatever
criticism this decision generated would have focused more on the criticism of
Blakely on Sixth Amendment doctrine, and less on the decision's systemic effects.
No dissent could have said in this case what Justice O'Connor said this year about
Blakely: "What I have feared most has now come to pass: Over 20 years of
sentencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal judgments are
in jeopardy." A dissenting judge could not have said to a judicial conference that
Wham v. Montoming was a number ten earthquake. The question is, how much, if
at all, should the circumstances and dark predictions matter in deciding a case like
Blakely? Do the predicted consequences bear at all on constitutional doctrine?
Why do they matter, if they do? Could a Court that would have ruled in Sam's
favor thirty years ago properly rule against him today? Have the developments of
the past thirty years changed the answer to the question, whether the Constitution
entitles an offender to trial by jury on facts that can double and triple his sentence?
Let me initially explain the lunatic proposition that changed circumstances
and consequences never matter in constitutional adjudication. The easiest case for
taking them into account is one in which the consequences reveal a defect in
someone's analysis or in his works. For example, if Blakely truly applies only to
maximum sentences, Congress can resolve all of the Federal Guidelines'
constitutional difficulties by enacting Frank Bowman's proposal to increase the top
of every Guidelines range to the formal statutory maximum while otherwise
leaving the Guidelines intact. The fact that Blakely's requirements would be
satisfied by this pointless and perverse legislation reveals a defect of the decision.
For the decision to make any sense it must apply to minimum as well as maximum
sentences.
Justice O'Connor's dissent offers a different reason for attending to the
consequences: The life of the law has not been logic, but experience, and Justice
O'Connor maintains that the sentencing reform movement of the past two decades
has been a smashing success. Blakely will undo this success story and plunge
sentencing back into disarray, disparity and darkness. Well, surely this grave
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threat bears on the proper result of the case. But suppose that Justice Scalia and
the Supreme Court majority had made just the opposite argument. The majority
opinion announced that reformers had exaggerated the problem, sentencing
disparity. They had examined only the sentences judges imposed, not the
sentences offenders served. The whole problem was a bogey. Moreover, the post-
Guidelines studies that purport to show reductions in racial disparity are flawed.
Some guidelines greatly increase disparity, restricting the discretion of judges
while ignoring the discretion of prosecutors, and have proven not only incoherent,
but harmful. All in all, the Guidelines had flopped. Well, I hope you would be
appalled by the thought of that majority opinion, and not because the majority
would have been wrong in its criticisms of the current Sentencing Guidelines. An
overall evaluation of the merits of the Guidelines was not the issue before the
Court, and indeed had little to do with the issue before the Court. Congress and
the Washington legislature had made their judgments about the Guidelines and
except insofar as these legislative bodies had failed to respect the right to jury trial,
their judgments were entitled to respect. Discussing the demerits of sentencing
guidelines in Blakely would have been like discussing which candidate would
make the better President in Bush v. Gore.21 Yeah! I mean, look how the decision
might affect who's going to be President. Those are real consequences, but when
we think that the Court might have been thinking about that, we think the Justices
have departed from their responsibilities and some consequences are not the
Court's concern.
Maybe the presumption of constitutionality entitles Justice O'Connor to praise
the Guidelines while Justice Scalia is forbidden to trash them. But something
seems troublesome about a doctrine that allows one group of judges to extol
legislation while another group may criticize only the points that it believes makes
that legislation unconstitutional. Maybe going beyond the alleged constitutional
defects of the legislation should be as much out of bounds for one side of the
constitutional dispute as the other.
Well, changed consequences also might matter for another reason.
Remedying the constitutional violation now would be more difficult than it would
have been thirty years ago when only one imaginary state got it wrong. Much of
America has become dependent on Montoming-style sentencing, and dependent in
a distinctive way. When a state court declares a statute prohibiting flag burning or
same-sex marriage unconstitutional, the state simply has one less statute. But
every state needs a sentencing system, and when an old one is declared
unconstitutional, a new one must replace it. The courts may not be able to devise
an effective remedy on their own.
We know the Congress of the United States had enacted mandatory minimum
sentences, rejected efforts to restrict the crack/powder disparity, multiplied the
number of sprawling federal crimes, multiplied the number of capital crimes, and
21 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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given us AEDPA, 22 the Sentencing Guidelines and the PROTECT Act.23 The list
of congressional disasters in the area of criminal justice could continue ad
nauseam, if not ad infinitum. The Congress has postured and strutted and rubber-
stamped the Justice Department without reflection and without a backward glance
at the ruined lives in its wake. I've written that Congress may well see Blakely as a
dare, and an opportunity, to push voters' anti-crime hot buttons, to engage in a
urinating contest with the Supreme Court, and to make federal sentences even
more monstrous than they already are. I think the best guess, in fact, is that
Congress will. Could a rational person favor a judicial ruling that he believes will
cause more harm than good? That idea appears unthinkable to most lawyers,
judges and academics. They leap to the bottom line. They evaluate Blakely by
analyzing what Congress might do in response to this decision, which responses
would make things better and which worse, and which responses are most likely.
When, even at the time of the Blakely decision, Congress obviously was likely to
respond by making things worse, why did the Supreme Court decide the case as it
did? What could the Court have been thinking?
Well, you'll hear all kinds of theories about Justice Scalia and the PROTECT
Act, but perhaps five of the Justices were thinking something terribly old-
fashioned: "That's not our job." As I wrote in a recent paper, the answer to the
question, "Does the Constitution entitle defendants to have the facts that make
them eligible for increased sentences determined by juries beyond a reasonable
doubt," cannot be "Yes," if wise leaders in Congress are likely to respond by
approving guided discretionary sentencing or the submission of some sentencing
issues to juries and "No," if those yahoos are likely to enact new mandatory
minimum sentences. The alarmed response of lawyers and judges to Blakely may
reflect their lack of confidence in both Congress and American democracy, and
this lack of confidence may well be justified. Perhaps we are witnessing the
democratic excesses the Framers of the Constitution feared. The television set, the
sound byte, and hard cash may have made the legislative deliberation about the
public good a wistful dream, and who else is left to do it but the judges? Well,
when lawyers, judges and academics begin to think that way, role differentiation
and the separation of powers collapse and the measure of every judicial decision
becomes how it will affect the entire world for good or ill. But if that's the job of
the Supreme Court, I doubt that they will save us. Maybe they should do what
Article III instructs them to do, and let the chips fall where they may.
Jonathan Wroblewski: Let me talk about administrative law. Justice Breyer and
Justice Kennedy, at the argument in Booker, asked a number of questions about
22 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered chapters of U.S.C. including 8, 18, 21, 22, 28, and 42).
23 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered chapters of U.S.C.
including 18, 28, and 42).
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indeterminate sentencing, parole and parole boards, parole commissions, and
parole guidelines. What struck me then and over the next several days is that all of
these attributes of sentencing and corrections law are part of a continuous and very
long, progressive movement that has coincided in large part with the development
of administrative law-itself a progressive movement. It started in sentencing and
corrections with Benjamin Franklin and the Quakers, with the idea of the
penitentiary as a place to do penitence, which led to the development of
indeterminate sentencing. It developed further-along with the creation of the
administrative state-with the advent of parole boards to bring expertise to
sentencing and corrections decisionmaking. Parole guidelines came when the
administrative state moved to administrative lawmaking. And it has continued
with the advent of sentencing commissions and sentencing guidelines. And it is
that progressive movement which is at stake now.
Why should it matter in terms of procedural protections whether an
administrative agency creates a rule triggering a particular punishment or whether
the Congress does? It matters because the values underlying the administrative
state-of bringing expertise and the advancement of human knowledge to bear on
public administration-have long been associated with different procedures. If, on
the other hand, sentencing factors are to be treated as elements in every way, then
there is a very serious question whether a sentencing commission can promulgate
such guidelines. If they can't, I think that's a shame, because if sentencing
commissions go out of business or are less directly involved in the promulgation of
sentencing rules I think outcomes will be driven even more by politics and will
suffer. That's not to say that I believe the United States Sentencing Commission
embodies the ideals of the administrative agency. But I do think it would be a
shame if because of Booker and Fanfan, the role of sentencing commissions is
diminished.
I believe that the ultimate result will be based on two things. One is the
political branch imperative to bring about certainty and severity and keep judicial
discretion limited. The second thing that I think will help determine post-
Booker/Fanfan sentencing policy is the Federal Criminal Code. The Federal
Criminal Code is a hodgepodge of statutes, which frankly needs some type of
comprehensive reform if it is to properly identify aggravating factors that are going
to bring about that certainty and severity, not to mention proportionality, that
Congress will require. For example, in most state statutory schemes, stealing is
divided up between stealing a little, stealing a lot, and stealing a real lot.
Unfortunately, much of the Federal Criminal Code isn't written that way. So the
statutes that are used to prosecute most people that steal things in the federal
system, the mail fraud and bank fraud statutes, just say if you defraud someone by
use of the mail or through a federally insured bank, you are subject to zero to
twenty years in prison. There's no differentiation in the code. Ultimately, the state
of the Federal Code means that there will need to be either comprehensive reform
or some type of guidelines-like overlay to insure that all cases are not treated alike
and that aggravating and mitigating factors are properly accounted for.
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Joseph Kennedy: First, an essential context for understanding the Blakely
decision is the state of legislative politics on crime over the last two decades. The
last two decades have seen a legislative process on crime that has been
characterized by demagoguery, by moral panics, by hastily-drawn legislation
passed in response to high-profile crimes, and by the use of crime as a weapon in
an on-going culture war. And that was on our good days. The bottom line of this
dysfunctional period of legislative policy-making in the area of crime is two
million people behind bars. It is a staggering fact, and it is the elephant in the
room. The key to understanding Blakely is seeing the formalism in the opinion as
a means of enforcing legislative discipline in areas where the legislative process
has grown dysfunctional. Apprendi and ultimately Blakely are best understood as
an alliance between liberal and conservative judges to discipline the legislative
process on crime without directly attacking the proportionality of the punishment
imposed, an attack that Scalia and Thomas would never join. Nancy King and
Susan Klein touched on this line of thinking in their Essential Elements article
24
when they compared Apprendi to clear statement rules. In the wake of Blakely I
would take this line of thinking even further. The main idea behind clear statement
rules is that you force the legislature to legislate in a way that is transparent in
order to foster a more deliberate democratic process. You force the legislature to
say what it means clearly. That makes it more likely that the legislature will really
mean what it says. In our context, that means the legislature would be less likely
to have simply passed a bill that responded to the crime of the month. Think of
this in terms of transparency. You know where the legislature stands when it
passes a mandatory minimum or three-strikes law because the law operates simply.
Guideline sentencing in contrast is opaque because guidelines sentences are so
conditional on so many different variables that it is hard to understand what the
legislature is really saying. I think Blakely is best understood then as a mandate for
a legislative process in the area of crime that does not delegate decisions to
formulas that are politically invisible. Because guideline sentencing is opaque, it
undermines political accountability because it is hard to know in a clear way what
the legislature is actually saying. Legislators are not, therefore, as accountable to
the electorate and have less incentive to be deliberate. Along these lines, Kennedy
talks in the opinion about interbranch dialogue, but it is a conversation that the
public cannot follow, and it has increasingly become a monologue in the federal
arena. With the monitoring provisions of the PROTECT Act you have Congress
sticking its finger in the courts' face saying, in effect, "I am going to be watching
you." Blakely, then, may help check populist punitiveness not by pitting the
judiciary against the legislature in a head to head proportionality review-a move
that the court has rejected in the past-but by forcing the legislature into a more
transparent process of lawmaking that may lead them to pause and reflect a bit
more when legislating a sentencing scheme.
24 Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1467 (2001) (cited
by Justice Kennedy in Harris, 536 U.S. at 561).
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Nancy King; I agree with Michael and disagree with Ron about the formality of
the basis for these opinions in Apprendi and Blakely. I believe that this is the
formal retreat from the fuzzy, or should I say furry, test of Justices O'Connor and
Breyer's wag-the-tail thing. I thinkT.ust as in Dixon, 25 cutting back on Grady,26-
remember that one?-and Hudson,2 cutting back on Halper.28 In these cases, the
Court is policing the line between what's a crime and what is not, where the Bill of
Rights kicks in and where it doesn't, and it is giving it a lot of leeway with this
formal sense that can be evaded to the legislatures to define them as they please.
Only in the most extreme circumstances will we ever encounter such a substantive
test to limit. And I think this is all part of the same formal effort to limit the
legislature, but not very much. Second, maybe the action isn't in the federal
system after all. They talk about the Federal Guidelines, but the clear statement
rule and the ability of the formal rule to do any work at all might actually be in the
states. Unlike in the federal system, the states have the constraint of cost, and so
when they look-as Ive been sitting on the Tennessee Blakely Commission that is
working on revising the state sentencing law to respond to Blakely--and when they
look at the cost of lifting the presumption and evading, right, versus the cost of
perhaps eliminating some of these enhancements altogether, it's not clear which
costs more, for the state taxpayer and for the criminal justice system. Do we want
more prisons or can we keep the lowering effect of the guidelines that we had by
perhaps eliminating some of these aggravating factors and sticking with the
criminal code that we had to begin with? So the clear statement, the process of
going through and picking and choosing among costs, disparity versus certainty
and so forth, might actually shift in a different direction in states where the fiscal
restraint is not moving it in that direction in Congress. But, frankly, I don't think it
matters at all to Scalia. He would be happy with mandatory sentences that don't
allow the judges any discretion. I don't believe it's a war between judicial power
and legislative power for him and Justice Thomas. I think instead it's a formal
division that the states can work around. The states are not interested in just
having high sentences. They want cheap, efficient rules that keep them in office.
And those rules may not be the sky-is-falling-projections that people are voicing
for Congress.
Stephanos Bibas: Back in the Williams era, it made sense to have a judge/jury
allocation of authority, when sentencing was a prospective enterprise of
25 United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508
(1990), and rejecting the "same conduct" test for double jeopardy).
26 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) (creating a "same conduct" test for double jeopardy).
27 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (disavowing the analysis of United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), and authorizing substantial deference to a legislative designation of a
sanction as "civil" in the context of a double jeopardy challenge).
28 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (determining whether a sanction denominated
"civil" constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes by the sanction's disproportionality to
the harm for which it was imposed).
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therapeutic assessment, as many commentators have already noted. But now that
sentencing seems to be primarily a retrospective assignment of blame, the whole
reason for having a second sentencing proceeding that is so trial-like, and yet is not
a trial, is really being called into question. My hope is that out of all of this, we
will finally get some real attention to the substantive values that we're serving
here. Are the sentencing procedures serving retribution and deterrence? Or back
to the transparency point that Joe Kennedy made, are these sentencing procedures
getting in the way of the substantive, moral, educative value of the law?. If they're
too mathematical, if they're too obscure for the public or victims to understand, is
there more we can do for transparency to serve those substantive goals? Is it a
good thing to bifurcate? Are we getting in the way of giving the victims a
substantive role in the process and serving victim values?
I think Apprendi and Blakely asked the right questions. I think it's good to be
focusing on that set of issues. I just wish that if the Court were focused on that,
that they had answered them in a different way. I think if you really care about
protecting the substance of the crimes, it doesn't fit as neatly in a procedural
provision, like the Fifth or Sixth Amendment, as it does, as Ron Allen said, in the
Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment's clauses on cruel and unusual
punishments and excessive fines seem like more natural ways to approach the
linkage between crime and punishment, which is really what we're talking about
here. On their very faces, those clauses suggest some kind of proportional linkage.
And also, an Eighth Amendment approach would regulate statutory and guideline
penalties equally, and maybe not encourage subversion in the same way, assuming
that I don't get nailed by Al Alschuler for bringing consequences into this
discussion. The question here shouldn't be whether a fact increases the maximum
penalty, but whether the maximum sentence for a crime would be cruelly
disproportional to the elements that have been proved at trial. In that world, unlike
the Blakely world, juries would, in a meaningful sense, actually authorize a
particular punishment or stigma, instead of the legal fiction that Justice Scalia is
relying on.
Jeffrey Fisher: I think that I was able to win the Blakely case because I gave the
Court a clear test. If you accept that there is something wrong with the statute that
was at issue in Apprendi--or at least with an even more aggressive, hypothetical
statute that would create a single crime of homicide and then let a judge find the
mens rea that determines whether the defendant is punished for manslaughter or
murder, or something in between-then I think it is very hard to come up with a
rule that would prohibit that abuse but allow sentencing laws like Washington's to
stand. Neither the state of Washington nor the United States really gave the Court
much of a proposal here, and the best the dissent could come up with on its own
was "too much," or "tail wagging the dog" test. I think the Apprendi majority
rightly saw that as just too malleable. I really do believe in the rule of Apprendi
and of Blakely. I realize that it is quite formalistic, and it is not particularly
grounded in pragmatism. But I think formalism in this context is okay.
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I think that separation of powers, not so much a concern about proportionate
or just punishment, is driving Apprendi and Blakely. I think both wings of the
majority-represented by Justices Scalia and Stevens-are content,
constitutionally speaking, to leave it to the legislature to come up with whatever
system they want, and if they want to give judges complete discretion within a
broad range, that's okay. These Justices really believe in the political process.
They take a very long view of the Constitution, and they trust that if the public
thinks overly broad discretion is unfair then legislatures will give the appropriate
procedural protection to "sentencing factors" meant to separate exceptional from
ordinary offenders.
Perhaps I'm young and a little naive, but I'm willing to take the same bet.
Kansas already went this route, and it looks like other states such as Washington
will go this route. Even if we have an immediate reaction from Congress that we
don't like, I still contend that, in the long-term, laying bare the choices for
sentencing before democratic bodies is a good thing. To those people-and there
are many-who say, "I disagree with Blakely because I think a horrible legislative
response is going to come," I hope you notice that you share common ground with
Blakely's supporters: both groups agree that Congress should not react with longer
standard sentences, enhanced mandatory minimums, or a return to unbridled
discretion at sentencing. Thus, I hope these Blakely detractors also will go to
Congress and tell them that such legislation would be horrible. If nearly everyone
agrees about what Congress should not do, and if we all make ourselves heard, it
might just make a difference. And this, I think, is the point of Blakely.
BLAKELY AND THE STATES: EFFECTS ON STATE LAW AND THE CHANGING ROLES
OF SENTENCING COMMISSIONS
Most of the public furor surrounding Blakely concerns the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines; but of course the case itself concerns state law, and special focus on
state implications and lessons is vital. How precisely have some states-e.g.,
California, Kansas, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and North Carolina-developed their
state schemes in ways that might have "pre-accommodated" Blakely, and how
might some now have to be changed? In this regard, what difference does it make
that the legislature rather than an agency sets the sentencing sub-rules? Do the
states offer lessons in how well-structured commission schemes can optimally
insulate criminal justice from the risks of political demagoguery inherent in
legislative politics? Do some state schemes continue to offer models to admonish
us of the failed aspirations of the federal scheme? To what degree must or will
state legislatures tweak their modern (somewhat) determinate sentencing rules to
stay safely within Blakely? Are the states more willing to accept the consequences
of Blakely for their sentencing schemes? Is this because state sentencing reform
has worked better than federal sentencing reform, so that states are more able to
deal with change?
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Barbara Tombs: I've been the Minnesota Sentencing Commission director just a
year. But this is d6jA vu for me. I went through this once in Kansas when we had
the Apprendi and Goulk 9 case. So when we faced this in Minnesota, I had a little
bit of background and a calmer approach maybe than a lot of states did. Minnesota
is a presumptive-determinate guidelines system. It has administrative guidelines,
much like the U.S. Sentencing Commission in that manner. But the biggest
problem we faced initially was trying to educate people in our state that our system
is different from the Federal Guidelines because so much of what was released
around the decision with Blakely focused on the Federal Guidelines. In Minnesota
we basically looked at our sentencing system and decided two things. First, what
was the underlying sentencing philosophy for the state? Because that guided us in
how we approached the response to Blakely. What was the purpose of sending
people to prison? And ours was focused on incarcerations being the least amount
possible, to allow only incarceration for serious offenses. So we have sort of a
modified just deserts system. We use a lot of alternatives up front before we put
somebody in prison. But when we put them in prison, we put them there because
we are punishing them. And as I'm looking at our sentencing system, the
aggravated departures appeared to be unconstitutional in the manner in which they
were applied. I've heard several references to the fact that the Blakely decision
ruled the Washington guidelines unconstitutional. That's incorrect. It did not say
they were unconstitutional. It says the way they apply the departures is
unconstitutional, and the departures themselves are not unconstitutional. So in
looking at that, we decided that our state was constitutional. But in our sentencing
system we had to modify the way in which we did our aggravated departures.
We took from background in Kansas, the State v. Carr30 case, which ruled
that dispositional departures [that is, sentences imposing a prison term rather than a
term of probation or parole] were not applicable to the Apprendi decision. And in
Minnesota we decided that would probably not carry in our state. And so we
approached it with Blakely affecting both dispositional and durational departures. I
hope I'm wrong in that. But with the judges set in our commission and the
discussions we've had with people, we felt that dispositional departures would
probably be affected.
We also went to our statutes. We had several statutory enhancement statutes.
They had nothing to do with departures, but they were statutes in which a sentence
could be enhanced by a finding of the court, such as predatory sex offenders,
dangerous and violent offenders, that type of thing. The court had to find
something in addition to the prior criminal history. That was an easy fix for us,
because we just basically changed the words from court to juries and resolved that.
We also have a consecutive sentencing issue. Not the consecutive sentencing in
29 State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001) (holding aspects of the Kansas sentencing scheme,
which authorized judge to impose longer prison sentence upon certain judicial findings
unconstitutional under Apprendi).
30 53 P.3d 843 (Kan. 2002).
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and of itself, that's not affected by Blakely. But we have a problem in the fact that
certain consecutive sentencing provisions say a prior "person felony." Well,
there's nowhere in our statutes where we define "person felony." And so the court
has been making that determination, whether a certain offense qualifies as a person
felony or not. The Commission is going back and looking at all of our offenses
and ranking them as either eligible or ineligible for consecutive sentencing, and
then the judge just chooses from that list. And then he doesn't have to make a
finding, again, addressing the Blakely issue. And mandatory minimums, although
we believe they are not affected by the Blakely decision, we have one mandatory
minimum, which has to do with the possession of a dangerous weapon. And what
happens when the weapons part of the element of the offense is not an issue at a
robbery, but where we have a gun present during a drug deal, which is not an
element of the offense, but it triggers that mandatory minimum. So for those
offenses they're going to have to do the bifurcated sentencing and deal with that in
a different way. Whereas, as far as the specific statutory enhancements I
mentioned earlier, we are requesting that the court go with the bifurcated system
because we don't have that many of them. We have about forty to sixty a year.
They're very serious offenses and just for the issue of public safety and the issue of
possible appeals, we are recommending the court goes with the bifurcated system
on that. There are several things that we're not sure of that we have in the
background. But we know that they're possible Blakely issues but we have not
recommended specific action on these at this time. And they have to do with the
custody status points, how you figure criminal history.
Richard Walker: Well, it's been a long, strange journey from Kansas being a
garden-variety indeterminate sentencing state about twenty years ago, to the kind
of state that drives Justice Scalia orgasmic in his opinions. And I wish I could say
that there has been a straight line of progress, something was incredibly logical and
inevitable and legally majestic about it. But it's been just a series of happenstance
occurrences which have been coupled with a willingness of Kansas to invest big
time in the commission process and on the part of the legislators to invest
themselves in it as voting members-moderate folks who were willing to look to
larger concepts than just their own parochial interests. And great staff work. I
mean, we really have a person here who, from Pennsylvania to Kansas to
Minnesota, has taken the principles of structured sentencing and presumptive
sentencing and made them work in ways that work in the hallways of the
legislature and with the professionals.
Well, Kansas, in 1989, was a mess. We were in prison over-crowding orders,
we had an indeterminate sentencing system in which it was not uncommon for
somebody to have a five-to-life sentence, which didn't mean five, didn't mean life,
and nobody knew what it meant. Could have meant two and a half years in prison,
could have meant twenty years in prison. There was the perception that between
urban and rural areas there were disparities in sentencing, as between folks who
were in the racial majority and racial minorities, that they weren't being treated
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equally between the Kansas borders. And just that the system was broken and
nobody knew what it meant in Kansas. And so the Sentencing Commission was
commissioned to study this. We did a study which created all kinds of havoc,
showing that in fact, there was built-in institutional discrimination in the system,
simply because people who had good jobs and who had family support were being
treated differently than folks who didn't. It was really a messy situation. And
nobody knew how many prisons were going to be needed.
But a lot of it had to do with just basic honesty in how the system worked.
And it was perceived not to be working. The Sentencing Commission studied this
and came up with the sentencing grid which we now have, based upon a drug grid
and a non-drug grid. We went from five classifications of felonies to ten
classifications of non-drug felonies and four classifications of drug felonies and
created presumptive sentences, some based upon the number of months. We did
leave border boxes which were basically a judge's free call on the tough issues.
People who either have serious crimes and not that much record or who had less
serious crimes, but had more lengthy criminal history. But it's driven by criminal
history and severity of the offense, no question about that. Then there are the
departure factors. And Kansas created kind of a legally anomalous standard of
substantial and compelling reasons for departure, either from non-prison to
imprisonment or backwards, for going above or below the particular box based
upon criminal history and severity of the offense. Those obviously became an
issue where a great deal of litigation triggered a list of statutorily approved factors.
But it was a non-exclusive list; quite a body of case law came about over that.
Prison population stabilized. The Kansas Legislature in effect used that as a device
to understand management of the system. In fact, the database that Barb Tombs
created was something that created a tremendous reservoir of legislative goodwill
for the guidelines and for the whole sentencing process in Kansas. And because of
that kind of thing, when the commission would make decisions and move in policy
directions to respond to the legislature, we had a high degree of credibility. Okay.
Along comes the situation of the Apprendi case and all of a sudden we go into the
situation with the Gould case, saying no, you can't go out. The Sentencing
Commission didn't just sit back and say, "We'll let the legislature worry about
this." They sat down and came up with what they felt were organized approaches
to this. One option was to just take the highest possible number you could
conceive of out there by the most serious box and say, "This is the peg we're going
to hang our hat on." That had the elegance of simplicity, but what they did was
say "No, that's wrong. We're going to go to a system such as we've created-the
bifurcated system." And quite frankly, for a variety of reasons which I don't have
time to touch on, it's been used very sparingly. The only experience I've had, for
instance, has been on agreed-upon situations. Most of the departures pre-Gould
and pre-Apprendi, were agreed upon. There were a number of contested ones, but
it was used as a plea bargain device, quite frankly.
But still, it's not been a big process. Briefly, three reasons. Penalties for the
most serious cases are already sky high in many cases. Second, it's very easy to
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use consecutive sentencing in Kansas. And the third reason is that we tend to have
a criminal code which facilitates subdividing crimes into multiple offenses: such as
a drug case, which can be divided into manufacturing, possession of drug
paraphernalia and necessary precursors, possession of an anhydrous ammonia in an
unapproved container. Thinking about the manufacturing of methamphetamine
and somebody in your family that's ever wanted to manufacture. I mean, it
literally can be subdivided down in separate offenses and then used as consecutive
sentencing. It's a tremendous plea bargain device. And so we can go into more
detail later, but that's the hundred-mile-an-hour tour of Kansas.
J. Bradley O'Connell: I think the "sky is falling" framework is a good one for
measuring different states. And in California, I would say it's much more than a
blip. It's more on the scale of a heavy meteor shower, but nowhere near an
asteroid. The irony in California is that I think we have a very high proportion of
sentences affected by Blakely--probably a much greater proportion than in the
federal system or in any other system that uses guidelines for upper departures.
Yet, ironically, it doesn't have dire implications for the long-term basic structure of
our sentencing. California is a non-guidelines determinate sentencing state. And
its structure is a great deal simpler than I understand the Guidelines to be. We
don't have points. We don't have a matrix. We don't have grids. A typical
sentence consists of a base term plus enhancements. And our base terms are quite
simple. They're triads: upper, middle, lower. The reason we're affected by
Blakely is that it is a presumptive sentencing system. We have a statute that says a
judge shall impose the middle term unless he finds aggravating or mitigating
factors. And we have, in our rules of court, separate lists of aggravating and
mitigating factors that can be applied to any crime, subject to the limitation that
they have to be something over and above the offense. You cannot make a dual
use of an element of the offense. So another important aspect is that our triads are
quite narrow. Our triads tend to be something like two years, three years, four
years, three, four, five, usually in that range. I can think of only a couple of
offenses that have triads with very significant departures. Voluntary manslaughter:
three, six, eleven. That's one of the biggest. A more traditional triad would be
something like three, four, five. Among other things, that means upper terms are a
lot more common than upward departures. Frank Bowman was saying that there
were about one percent upward departures in the federal system. Sadly, there
don't seem to be statistics on this in the California system, but my own impression
is, maybe twenty to thirty percent of sentences are upper terms. So you have a
huge number of cases affected. Why is it not all that important? It's because long
ago, our enhancements overtook our base terms as comprising the bulk of the
sentences in serious cases. We run the jurisdiction least affected by Apprendi
because we've got loads of enhancements, which function identically as the one in
Apprendi, which is that they are a separate penalty that sits on top of the base term.
But we already had statutory rights to a trial on those enhancements. I would
occasionally give my little spiels to trial attorney groups on how to preserve the
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record and things. And I'd be talking about recent Supreme Court cases, I'd
mention Apprendi, and no one would have heard of it. It didn't affect practice at
the trial level. And it affected us a lot at the appellate level just because we got to
take advantage of a Chapman31 standard, but for a trial practice, it didn't change
things much at all. The enhancements are what comprised most of one's sentence
in California. In fact, California, like so many states, has seen a huge increase in
sentences in the roughly twenty-five years since determinate sentencing was
instituted. Yet, there's been very little change in the base terms. The difference is
that maybe in 1977, a robber who used a gun and caused serious bodily injury
maybe would end up with a sentence of nine or ten years. Now, he might end up
with a sentence on the order of thirty years to life. That's without any change in
the base term, which is still, I think, something like three, four, five, but with a
steady escalation of enhancements. So in the short immediate term, we are
fighting all over the state over our upper terms. And we've got a couple in the
Supreme Court. But what we're fighting over is one- or two-year sentence
increments per case. So a larger percentage of cases are affected but a lesser per
case quantum of the sentence is affected.
Steven Chanenson: For about twenty-five years, Pennsylvania has had
presumptive sentencing guidelines. However, we are also an indeterminate state,
which means we have parole release authority. As such, judges impose a
minimum and a maximum sentence-for example, a term of two to four years. For
state (as opposed to county) sentences, the defendant cannot be released before the
expiration of the judicially imposed minimum sentence. The Pennsylvania
Guidelines only apply to the minimum sentence. When the judge imposes this
minimum sentence, she must follow the Guidelines, which are flexible and allow
for a healthy amount of judicial discretion with some appellate review. In contrast,
the maximum sentence is left completely to the judge's discretion. The judge may
impose a maximum sentence up to the traditional maximum sentence set by the
General Assembly. Furthermore, our state courts have long called the maximum
sentence the "true sentence," in part because that is the amount of time the
defendant is under the control of the criminal justice system-either in prison or on
parole subject to incarceration. For Blakely purposes, the fact that the
Pennsylvania Guidelines allow judges unfettered discretion to impose the
maximum sentence is critical. It is our view that we avoid any and all Blakely
problems because the maximum or true sentence is still within the judge's
complete discretion. Nevertheless, Blakely has provided an opportunity to focus
the attention of the General Assembly on sentencing issues. Pennsylvania still has
some Apprendi issues floating about-particularly in the area of three-strikes. I
am optimistic that the General Assembly will be willing to resolve these issues in
the near future.
31 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (stating constitutional errors at trial may be
held harmless if the court finds harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt).
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Ronald Wright: North Carolina has a sort of standard presumptive grid. It looks a
lot like Minnesota, maybe like Kansas. What's distinctive about North Carolina is
its emphasis on controls of intermediate and community sentences as well as
prison; so, there are some guidelines for which intermediate sentence you're going
to impose. And that I think is completely unaffected by Blakely. There aren't any
departures from the guidelines as such. Instead, the judges are told, "You can pick
a sentence within the standard-the presumptive range, the mitigated range or the
aggravated range." But those are the only possibilities. There is no further
statutory range for departures, up or down from that, But on the other hand, those
ranges are somewhat generous so that there's quite a bit of play for the judges
within those three ranges. And if you look at the numbers of upward or of
mitigating and aggravated sentence ranges, sentences that are imposed, the
numbers look and sound an awful lot like the departure numbers from other states.
So that functionally, these mitigated and aggravated ranges look like departures.
How does Blakely affect this system? First of all, it's very clear and the North
Carolina courts have been quick to rule on the merits on these things. They say
that any sentence that moved up into the aggravated range is affected by Blakely
because you have to make certain findings to justify an aggravated range sentence.
That amounts to about seven percent of the cases for any given year. Last year it
was 2,000 cases, about seven percent of the total sentences. There are also some
smaller features of the system that could affect, in small ways, a lot of cases.
Things like the prior similar record or prior similar offense that gets you an extra
prior record point, similar to the Minnesota system. How has the state reacted to
this? My impression, just as an outside observer, is that it's been a reaction of
patience, that people think these are important cases and we can't live with this
indefinitely, but for the moment, the prosecutors have put all of their aggravated
range sentencing on hold. They said that we'll eventually get back to doing this,
and when murder cases come around, we have to do it. And we will handle that
like we have been recently handling firearm enhancements. So we'll do this, but
we will bide our time and see how this goes. And the second reaction that I've
noticed is that the commission is taking its lead on this, that they've moved along
sort of deliberately, somewhat slowly, but everybody is saying, "Well, the
Commission's going to think about this and in January or maybe February, they'll
come back to the general assembly with some possible fixes that might be
necessary for Blakely." So my impression is a reaction in the state that is patient.
In North Carolina, you could think of Apprendi as inoculating the system, and
immunizing it from the later onslaught of the Blakely virus. Apprendi was an
attenuated form of the virus. It was easier to deal with, because it didn't affect that
many cases. So it comes along. In North Carolina, we had to figure out what to do
with firearm enhancements. We used to be able to handle these without a jury
trial, now we've got to have a jury trial. What do we do? Well, some prosecutor
just makes up some language on the fly, tries it; it turns out you also have to make
up the jury special interrogatory forms and a few jury instructions. They gave it all
a try, and the defense attorneys all along the way are objecting, "Hey, wait a
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minute. There's nothing in the statute that allows this. You can't do this if there's
no statutory authorization." But they were not really fighting that hard on this
question, because they were strategic enough to realize, "Maybe on the defense
side, I don't want the legislature jumping into this too quickly. So maybe I'd
rather they just stay out of it for a while, and I'll have to raise the argument but I
won't push it too hard."
So, lo and behold, this not-very-carefully-thought-out procedural way through
the maze survives scrutiny. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in State v Lucas,
32
approves it. And you've got your antibody now. Now, you've figured out how
you're going to survive the later onslaught of similar questions in Blakely, so that
now that Blakely has arrived, all of the prosecutors that I've talked to, all the
defense attorneys in the state that I've talked to are saying, "Well, how do we
handle it? The same way we do firearm enhancements." Because why? Is it
elegant? Does it further the values of Blakely? Well, no, it works. It has survived
appellate review. There might be better ways to do it, more efficient ways, but this
one works, and we can go with that. And an extra virtue for the defense is we
don't have to be very explicit about going to the legislature and asking them to
really think about what they want the world to look like now. So we can have a
very low visibility, low impact, and very reliable fix that was created on the fly
during the earlier set of issues.
This whole sequence of events shows something about the genius of the
common law. We've got a smaller version of the case that comes along early,
Apprendi, we get some preliminary efforts to solve all the procedural ins and outs,
and somehow or another, we are now going to carry those forward and they will
become entrenched and unthinkable to change in North Carolina just through the
genius of the common law. Actually, for a lot of systems, those fixes that came
into place without a lot of reflection are going to be especially true for the drafting
of the indictments, the language that works in the indictments, and the special
interrogatories. Where it's going to work less well is with jury instructions.
Marc Miller: I mean to pose now a question to Kevin Reitz about how
generalizable the comments from these five states are to other states, given his
long-standing interest in understanding the variety of state systems and sentencing
reform. This is a much larger enterprise than just the federal enterprise, but one of
the things we're hearing so far in all the stories, with the exception of California, is
this interesting role of a commission and the interplay with the legislature and the
kind of choices that the commission makes, but also the kind of trust and the
patience of prosecutors in the role of a commission in a state like North Carolina.
So Kevin, can we generalize about how disruptive, fundamentally disruptive,
Blakely is? And to set up that question, I'd like to read a short question that was
sent to me by Richard Frase, who was going to be here and be part of the panel and
then got sick and was unable to fly out. But Richard, who also, along with Kevin,
32 548 S.E.2d 712 (N.C. 2001).
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is one of the handful of folks that systematically followed states, wrote, "I would
argue that Blakely is harshest on the best state systems. Presumptive guidelines
govern more than just the minimum sentence with reasonable recommended
sentences and severity levels, thus justifying more than a token number of upward
departures. Blakely may encourage good states to go bad and bad states to stay
bad."
Kevin Reitz: It's treacherous to generalize. Different states have different
dimensions of Blakely problems. Some are probably not affected at all on the
systemic level. Blakely has said that the traditional indeterminate states remain
constitutionally untroubled by the jury trial rule, even though we know the judges
in those states engage in a lot of invisible fact-finding. The very breadth of their
discretion seems to somehow insulate them from jury trial scrutiny. As many as
one-half of the states have some sort of guideline or presumptive sentencing
system. Across those states there is a range of uncertainty, even as a threshold
matter, on whether Blakely applies to them. Ohio has quite a detailed set of
statutory presumptions, which they call guidelines. So there is a fierce debate:
does Blakely even apply at all in Ohio? I think it does, but many in Ohio think it
doesn't. There are also states that have guidelines that are explicitly called
"voluntary" guidelines, or the guidelines are treated as advisory by the courts. Yet
in most of these jurisdictions, there is a statutory requirement for departures that
judges must give a statement of the facts and circumstances that have persuaded
the judge not to follow the recommended guideline sentence. It's at least possible
that Blakely will attach to that sort of system.
Is the requirement that you make a factual statement the same thing as making
a factual finding legally essential to punishment in the case? There are many
potentially available responses. I tend to group these under two headings:
approach and avoidance. It's possible to meet Blakely head on, as Kansas has
done, and as Minnesota proposes to do, by taking the Supreme Court's holding
seriously, that juries are required for certain kinds of fact-finding. For states that
choose to provide juries in those circumstances, you're taking Blakely on its word.
The avoidance strategies alter the fundamentals of sentencing systems so that
Blakely passes them by. In Pennsylvania, for example, the conjunction of
guidelines plus parole release gives rise to the argument that Blakely doesn't apply.
Is that constitutionally airtight? No one knows for sure. There's discussion in
some states that have presumptive guidelines, as in the federal system, to convert
guidelines to voluntary advisory prescriptions, rather than prescriptions that have
force of law. That would also be an avoidance technique.
Now, at the state level, this fundamental fork in the road, the choice between
approach and avoidance, depends upon how policymakers weigh the prospective
costs of either route. For most states there will be real costs imposed in either
direction. The Kansas system, for example, does not function as well today as it
did before it chose to meet the jury trial right head on. But yet, the landscape in
Kansas would be far worse if Kansas had decided to dump its guideline systems
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entirely and go back to indeterminacy or move to voluntary guidelines or replace
guidelines with mandatory minimums. So Kansas faced the choice between the
incremental cost of creating a jury procedure for fact-finding at sentencing and
making broader systemic changes that would have undone much of what the state
has labored hard to achieve over many years. In the better reform states where
there is a real investment and a sense of accomplishment in what has occurred
under sentencing reform, policymakers are more likely to approach, rather than
avoid Blakely. These systems will probably lose something in judicial discretion,
transparency, and perhaps even the reviewability of sentencing decisions. But the
basic building blocks of structured sentencing, including the ability to predict and
control prison growth and the use of prison resources over time, will be preserved.
That basic function of guidelines, in many states, certainly in Kansas and
Minnesota and North Carolina, is seen as central, and the procedural costs of
meeting Blakely head on are probably lower than opening the state up to an
uncontrolled system. States that feel they've made progress on those demands
don't want to roll back the clock. But we do see in many states, even a state like
Washington, a serious contemplation of major systemic change. Movement in the
Washington system from a presumptive guideline system to a voluntary guideline
system seems to be a real possibility. Alaska is seriously considering a top-down
guideline system in Blakely's wake that would set presumptive sentences very
high. And then you have to have legitimate mitigating factors to get down to what
would ordinarily be an appropriate sentence.
There is at least a systemic cost in driving the mechanism for aggravated
sentences to some of these other things. In Kansas, if you have a formal departure
mechanism that asks the judge to put his or her reasoning on the record and then
that's appealable, there's more visibility and there's reviewability in the process
that gets you to the aggravated sentence. On the other hand, if that discretion in
some number of cases is forced underground, in Kansas, the judge's discretion to
impose a consecutive sentence is unconstrained, as it is in some other states, the
decision whether or not to do it and the extent of the increase is unconstrained. So
the decision to impose a consecutive sentence becomes invisible, and the judge
doesn't have to make a statement of reasons. No one has the right to appeal that.
We don't even know why. And to me, that is a loss of visibility and reviewability
in some number of cases, that's unfortunate.
Barbara Tombs: When we're talking about the aggravated departures, there are a
limited number, but in our state, even though they represent a small number,
they're important. And our approach to addressing the ability to do aggravated
departures was important because number one, we think when departures are
granted, they're necessary. And the other issue is taken into consideration because
if we do not allow those departures to occur, there will be the movement toward
allocating the maximum sentences. Our argument has always been our ranges are
very close. There's less than fifteen percent spread in numbers within a certain
cellblock. And we've kept them like that and the sentences intact because they are
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for the normal sentence, the ordinary sentence. For those extraordinary sentences,
we allow the departures. If the departure factor wasn't addressed to respond to
Blakely; then we see a movement to increase those grid cells to have a much larger
range, maybe fifty percent to encompass those necessary higher sentences. Then
we lose what was the underlying purpose of out guidelines. The other issue being
that we have really good data. Being able to balance the underlying principle with
that data so that we can say if we do this, "This is how," in many cases has been
really good for us in trying to control some of the hysteria.
J. Bradley O'Connell: To a greater degree than Apprendi, Blakely will reveal the
practical difficulties with the two biggest anomalies in the Apprendi line of cases,
which are Almendarez-Torres and Harris. Let's just think of Almendarez-Torres.
I'm thinking of what various people have said about their recidivist factors,
custody points, and prior offenses. In California we have several recidivist factors,
factors which are being urged, common-with Almendarez-Torres, that go well
beyond the bare fact of prior conviction. Poor performance on probation or parole,
which frequently, in our court experience, in the probation report says, "I called up
his parole officer, and he said that there haven't been many parole revocations.
This guy's a disaster on parole. He's always using drugs, he's always getting
arrested for stealing." Under a broad view of Almendarez-Torres, well, his parole
is just part of his sentence on a prior case, which is a recidivist factor, so you don't
need to worry about that because that doesn't implicate jury rights. Although that
is a classic example of something depending on findings of historical fact, which
have never been adjudicated at all, much less adjudicated in a prior proceeding in
which the defendant had a right to a jury and truth beyond a reasonable doubt. So
the sorts of factors that are affected by Blakely are less clean than those affected
initially by Apprendi, in terms of the current offense versus prior conviction
dichotomy.
A solution that says we're going to give you the constitutional rights required
by Blakely, but no more, would create anomalies because you would have some
aggravators found by juries, some aggravators found by judges, and all mitigators
found by judges, even though aggravators and mitigators were drafted with the
expectation that the same decisionmaker would be making all findings and then
balancing the factors.
Michael Dreeben. Before Blakely was argued, I called up and talked to several
Kansas prosecutors in the anticipation that if the court actually asked, "Well, how's
this working out in Kansas?" I would have some anecdotal information that I
carefully called on to support my thesis that I had gotten the straight story from
Kansas. And what I got from Kansas prosecutors is that State v. Gould and the
statutory revision that followed it had killed off upward departures because it had
raised an unbelievable 'hairball of procedural issues. And the one that I remember
the most is that nobody can figure out how to voir dire a jury in a bifurcated
sentencing hearing in a way that wouldn't cause problems. Because if you're
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going to voir dire the jury on an aggravated factor like the death penalty, it's
problematic for defense counsel to have to do the voir dire on a potential
aggravating factor that the jury might never have to hear if they find the defendant
not guilty. And the state didn't like it either because it created numerous potential
appellate issues. And that was just one example. So I believe I talked to the
prosecutor in the busiest district in Kansas. He said we just basically quit it
altogether, and that the Kansas legislature was not unhappy about this because they
were tired of paying for longer sentences anyway. So there was no -adverse
feedback from the prosecutors dropping it. But the point I wanted to follow up
here is when I heard Judge Walker describing the Kansas system, it sounded as
though the upward departures were still valid as a plea bargaining device. And the
consequence it sounded to me was that prosecutors and defense counsel are able to
charge bargain in a way that will dictate the sentence. And if the underlying
original premise of a guideline system like the federal system is to avoid
unwarranted disparities that are caused by differential exercises of judicial
discretion, is it the case in Kansas that Kansas is not worried about that problem
and is comfortable, or is only worried about that problem and it's not worried
about prosecutors, or is unwarranted disparity not really a factor at all in the
Kansas system?
Richard Walker: Even before the Gould decision, when we were running
statewide about ten or fifteen percent of cases having departures, the vast majority
of them were already agreed to. Now, judges aren't bound by that and I always tell
the defendant, "Do you understand that you're not bound by the plea negotiations?
I can sentence you up to the fullest extent of the law, regardless of negotiations."
But as a practical matter, you don't want to start rejecting those on a routine basis
or you're going to be trying jury trials all over the place. So I can't say it hasn't
had an effect, although it's very difficult to quantify because that kind of charge
bargaining-bargaining to a box on the grid-was going on well before any of
these Apprendi or Blakely cases came along. There's always been that sort of
thing since judges have always used their discretion to accept or reject pleas, so I
don't see that as a big watershed.
J. Bradley O'Connell: Well, let's take the example of a victim who is severely
injured, possibly involving disfigurement. We have for a long time had a set of
great bodily injury enhancements. And those enhancements, with jury
instructions, have the same degree of definition as the elements of an offense. In
fact, our definition of great bodily injury, which is an enhancement you could
apply on any crime, maybe an assault, maybe a robbery, parallels the definition we
use for certain other crimes such as felony battery, in which serious bodily injury is
the element of the offense. So those are routinely tried to juries as part of the trial
in chief. And they are submitted as a separate verdict form. Other examples: the
less common ones are age of victim, drug quantity, anything that is an integral part
of the current offense currently is just tried to a jury. Now, we do have bifurcation.
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To date, that is only being used for prior convictions enhancements. And the most
common, that sometimes takes the form of having been the prior conviction trial,
occur immediately after the jury renders its verdict on the case-in-chief. As to the
prior convictions, it's common to bifurcate and then ultimately waive a jury on the
priors. We do now have down the road some possibly more difficult bifurcation
issues because there certainly could be situations of trauma to the victim and the
victim's family or things of that sort that come within one of our aggravators that
would, from a defense perspective, be disastrous to be tried as part of the case-in-
chief. And there's at least some discussion about the prospect of trying to
bifurcate factors like those. But we haven't reached that point. There are things
that are part of the immediate case-in-chief, including, for example, gang
enhancements. Gang enhancements in California are more complex than your
average offense because they require one to prove the characteristics of the gang
and to prove that the gang committed a number of other offenses. So it's a mini-
trial over this entity, which is frequently not one of your marquee gangs like the
Crips or the Bloods, but rather it's the Stanford Alley Boys or something. And you
have to have a little mini-trial. Now, there have been attempts to bifurcate those,
which have largely gone nowhere. So, those typically, prejudicial though they are,
get tried in the case-in-chief and are subject to a separate verdict with instructions
about how many other crimes have been committed that define doing the current
crime, in furtherance of the purposes of the gang. So those are part of the trial-in-
chief.
Douglas Berman: Ohio went to sentencing reform exclusively for economic-
control reasons. We don't really care about disparity concerns that much. What
we care about is it's costing too much and all the non-violents are going away and
all the violents are getting out and the bed spaces are disorganized. And so Ohio
had a very systematic effort to control sanctions. And in addition, and to its great
credit, Ohio focused on non-incarcerative policy and regulation; it's a dispositional
issue and it isn't Blakely-ized. Ohio spent a lot of time focusing all of its guideline
reform on non-incarcerative presumptions. And then there are all these findings
you have to make in order to incarcerate. And so that's one of many issues. How
that plays out in Ohio will be interesting to watch. In addition, they intentionally
said, "We're not going to do a grid. We think grids are part of the problem. We're
just going to have statutory ranges." That's all there is. And then there's an
enormous amount of regulation about where in the range you need to be.
Specifically, there's a presumption. But there's a presumption that you get the
minimum term in the range. So in addition to it depending on what felony you
have, there's a presumption that if it's not incarcerative, you have to make findings
to put the person in jail. Yet the presumption in other felony settings is that you
have to have the minimum of the range, so if it's three to five years, it is a fairly
narrow range. You have to give the minimum unless you make certain findings.
And this is part of what's driven the fact/law distinction in my mind. Here is an
example of one of the findings that will allow a judge in Ohio to go above the
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minimum statutory range for an offense: a finding that the shortest prison term will
"demean the seriousness of the offender's conduct or will not adequately protect
the public." How do you make that a jury issue? It's certainly not a question of
historical fact. And even more broadly, it's the kind of thing that is uniquely for a
judge to know about-for the special competency of a judge. You may think
different judges will make different disparate judgments about that, but it's
amazing how functionally Ohio's law is written. You read that and you think, "Of
course. That makes sense," to do the minimum term, unless the shortest prison
term will "demean the seriousness of the offender's conduct." There's a nice little
retributivism for those theorists out there. And "will not adequately protect the
public"-there's a little consequentialism thrown in, either/or. But still, it's
fascinating to imagine that that's a jury decision. Interestingly, the defense bar
says, "Of course it's a jury decision. Right, you know? Indisputably."
Kevin Reitz: The Ohio appellate courts have done something that a lot of the
appellate courts at the state level haven't done under their system. And that is,
they have taken an active interest in reviewing sentences within the guidelines of
the statutory ranges for substantive proportionality. This isn't a constitutional
concept. It's a power that's given to them by statute so I call this a sort of sub-
constitutional proportionality review. I think it's a good idea. I've adopted that
and been pushing it into the Model Penal Code. It's not clear to me that sub-
constitutional proportionality analysis is constitutional anymore, after Blakely. If
an appellate court says, "Well, I'm going to look at the sentence that the trial judge
imposed and I'm going to compare that against the factual record, leading to that
sentence, and I find that the factual record was not adequate to support the
sentence given," what the appellate court, in essence, is saying is, "Well, trial
judge, you need to define some more facts that are needed to be additional factors
of some kind. In an armed robbery case, if you don't show me the injury or the
victim, you can't get up to the maximum sentence." An appellate court that goes
down that route is creating a fact-finding requirement or a fact-finding threshold, at
least in theory. If an appellate court does that and it becomes a legal requirement
in the state, is that any different than a sentencing commission creating
presumptions or fact-finding requirements in order to support sentences at certain
levels? One of the doctrinal uncertainties about Blakely is whether appellate
review includes the adequacy of the factual record. It seems to violate Blakely in
all sorts of different ways.
Ronald Allen: Two points about rationality and then just one interesting historical
comment. I want to generalize, Kevin Reitz, about what you said in response to
Doug Berman. You raised the issue of questions of law versus questions of fact a
couple of times. That may be a useful tool here, but when you're talking about
questions of law and you talk about demeaning something, I take it what you mean
is you would decide that with propositions that have truth value. It's true or false
that something is demeaning or not demeaning. But what that means is what we
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label a question of law is a question of fact. So underlying all these issues are
facts. Now, you might sort out facts in other ways, but you're not going to get any
purchase on this by the question of the law/fact distinction. Second, I'm hearing
that one response to Blakely is pressure to move systems away from reasons
towards discretionary sentence, parole, and consecutive sentences where it's
unarticulated. That's an unintended consequence here. The third is a historical
point. There's a disagreement as to the effect of Blakely on the states. Most of the
people actually working in individual states seem to think this is not that big of a
problem, whereas Kevin who's worked with many states indicates maybe it's a
larger problem. But in any event, there's a very interesting inversion of the normal
problem of constitutionalizing aspects of criminal procedure. The normal problem
of constitutionalizing aspects of criminal procedure is you take provisions that are
supposed to be applied to the federal government that worked in a certain sort of
way, and apply them to the states, which have much different problems. And they
become unworkable at the state level. Whereas what I'm hearing here is kind of
the inverse of that-that this problem may not be such a big problem for the states,
but a much larger problem for the federal government. For what it's worth, during
the procedural revolution of the late '50s to the early '60s, this issue of the
practicality of applying Bill of Rights provisions to the states was a really big
ticket item. It led to the watering down of jury trial rights; somebody mentioned
the six-month limit yesterday, but that's not the only-one about the size of a jury.
The point is those were driven by concerns about the effect of this on the states.
IDEALISTIC REFLECTIONS: THE FUTURE OF SENTENCING REFORM
Although the Supreme Court has tossed the world of prosecutors and criminal
defense attorneys into near chaos, sentencing reform activists have viewed the
Court's decisions as an opportunity to reform a system they have seen as badly
flawed since its inception twenty years ago. Some critics of rigid guidelines argue,
for instance, that racial disparities endemic in previous indeterminate sentencing
regimes have merely become rules memorialized in sentencing guidelines
themselves, and that strict guidelines are unduly harsh and contribute to the
country's skyrocketing prison population. From the other side, some point to the
high percentage of federal guideline minimum sentences handed out and to the rate
of downward departures as evidence that the judges still cannot be trusted with
sentencing. These critics would seek further legislation to narrow the choices of
judges and "toughen" sentences even more. The new Sixth Amendment doctrine
will surely lead to significant changes in the way we sentence defendants. Will it
lead to changes in the character of sentences themselves? Will or should
policymakers now take another look at mandatory minimums? What organization
or body would be best suited for such an examination? What areas of the current
sentencing system are most flawed and need the most change? Can we expect or
should we encourage legislatures to examine the varied sentencing schemes
adopted by different states? Might we be better off after all with non-mandatory
[Vol 2:619
THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN SENTENCING
guidelines? Or is it quixotic to think that non-mandatory guidelines can solve the
problems at which more rigid guidelines were aimed?
David Yellen: The whole sentencing reform movement was, in large part, the
result of some very idealistic and forward-looking thinking by some fairly
visionary academics and others. And it's important to keep in context the time
frame involved. Those of us who are deeply involved in the nitty-gritty at one
moment can't see, necessarily, when things are going to change in a fairly
significant way. To wit: How many of us anticipated Blakely? So, how many
other changes are coming down the road that we don't know about? Given we
now have almost twenty-five years of experience with sentencing guidelines, there
is, I think, a pretty broad consensus about what works well and what doesn't work
so well. There are a lot more questions about how to get systems improved. But
that's our goal.
Kevin Reitz: At the state level, the successful innovations in sentencing guideline
reform have been among the few bright spots in American criminal justice history
in the last thirty years. The Model Penal Code proposals have been going in the
direction of a sentencing commission/sentencing guidelines/appellate review
system not so different from that in Washington State, Minnesota, North Carolina,
and Pennsylvania. There are a number of states that have had great success,
certainly, compared to other sentencing systems in America with those
experiments. Post-Blakely, the calculus potentially changes. But the
recommendations that one would make to a state considering sentencing reform, I
think, are quite similar to the recommendations that one would make to a state that
has adopted a series of sentencing reforms and now must respond to Blakely. And
I think the answer to that question is, probably, approach not avoidance. If the
basic structure of sentencing presumptions and guidelines and a permanent
commission and appellate review have given you results that you value, the
incremental cost of accommodating to Blakely will be real but manageable. But
they will be incremental and much smaller than moving away from an overall
model that gives the state benefits that the state wants to preserve or should want to
preserve.
In any jurisdiction considering a big change, a moment of constitutional
uncertainty, as with the Blakely decision, affects the political dynamics of whether
you can make a change. The Blakely court has made it clear that in determinate
sentencing systems, where discretion is exercised, but we don't see it, it's not
reviewable. It isn't regulated and remains constitutionally unproblematic, at least,
under the Apprendi/Blakely line of cases. States like Massachusetts and other
states that still have that form of structure are going to be tempted to some greater
extent to say, "Well, the path of least resistance is to stay with what we have. Why
bring on all these questions and uncertainties if we don't need to?" It adds to the
problem of realizing systemic change. The importance of a Model Penal Code
project may increase rather than decrease, if I'm right that Blakely creates a
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perverse set of legislative incentives towards greater reliance on indeterminacy and
mandatory minimum sentencing enhancements. The states will require
information to dissuade them from taking those paths. Model legislation can help
make that case.
Frank Bowman: I think it's true that the atmospherics regarding the sentence
severity, the general public perception of appropriate sentence levels, but perhaps
particularly with respect to drug crimes, may have changed, in an evolutionary sort
of way. Perhaps, the public may be fractionally less inclined to throw the book at
everybody and, particularly, anybody who's labeled as being a drug offender. I
think there's some truth to that, perhaps because I, myself, am mellowing with age
and it's not my job anymore to put people in prison for long periods of time for
drug offenses. But I also think that in the relevant group of decision-makers in the
federal system, to wit Congress, the normal reaction in most of us, and myself
included, has been, "Oh, my God. Think of what those yahoos will do." And I
think there's a good deal of truth to that as well. I think the instincts of this
relatively small group of people who stand at the intersections and hold the levers
of decisional power in Congress, and particularly, in the Republican House and
also a relatively small group of people who stand at the critical junctions in the
Department of Justice decision-making-those are the ones who stand in the way
of at least incremental improvement in the possibilities for meaningful reform. I
think that personnel changes in a relatively few positions in Washington could
change the dynamic tremendously. And by that, I think enough has changed in the
mood of the country and the mood of the population that if you change a relatively
few people, then it's possible that you get somewhere. How far you get, I don't
know. But I think you could. I think that the underlying societal dynamic has
changed enough that if you move a few folks, you've got a chance.
Judge Charles Breyer: Well, of course, I believe that the role of a sentencing
judge is to be the sentencer. That he or she is the one person in this system that
purportedly is not an advocate and that is there to try to apply the basic goal of
sentencing, which is that it achieves a fair result. But the question, "Where do we
go from here?" reminds me of the lobster in the fish tank in a restaurant. You
know, that's a good question. But you're not quite certain. I mean, you, sort of,
know where you're going to go from there, right? And we all, sort of, are very
nervous about where we're going to go from here. If you were to ask the question,
"Where would I like to go from here?" I would like to go as follows: I would like
the Sentencing Guidelines to be advisory. I would like judges to view the
guideline range as presumptively reasonable. I would like judges to be able to give
reasons why they don't follow the range that is set forth in writing; their reasons
for any particular deviation from the range. That reason would be subject to
appellate review. I would like to have, in sentencing issues, the standard of
beyond a reasonable doubt. I see no reason not to have the standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt. Judges are comfortable applying it. It's far clearer than the
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probability or preponderance test. And so I would like to have that. I would like
to get rid of the idea that you could possibly use acquitted conduct. Even though,
of course, it's a Supreme Court case that tells us that we could, we must, actually
apply it if we find by a preponderance of evidence of that conduct exists. But if
you go over to the other standard, you're not going to be so troubled, I think, by
that Supreme Court case. I would like to make sure that notice is given prior to the
entry of plea, as to what the prosecutor believes the range of sentencing to be and
the factors to be included in it. In the event that the prosecutor comes-and be
limited to it, except in the case where he has newly discovered evidence. And if he
can demonstrate that-he or she-that there's newly discovered evidence, then, I
think the answer is to allow the defendant to withdraw the plea. Now, that's not
perfect. We all know that's not perfect. But it's not so imperfect that it can't be
achieved as a result. So that is where I would like to be.
At the argument at Blakely, the Chief Justice said, "Why don't we take every
crime," and I'm not sure he was advocating this, "Why don't we take every crime,
every federal crime and say, 'The punishment for every single federal crime is not
less than one year or more than life?' He said, "Doesn't that take care of the
Blakely problem?" The answer was yes, it probably did take care of it. Justice
Kennedy said, "What about the system in state court, such as the old California
system, where the judge got up and he says, "I hereby sentence you to the term
prescribed by law." In California, the sentence for assault with a deadly weapon, I
think was a year or something like that to twenty years or thirty years or
something. And it would be the Parole Commission, the Board of Prison Terms
and so forth that would set it. And he said, "That's what you used to have." Of
course, he had no reasons and blah, blah, blah. That's what you used to have.
Under the states, would that be okay? And he said, "Yeah, that would be okay,
under Blakely." So what I'm suggesting is, it does take care of, I think, the Blakely
problem. It may introduce some other problems, which would be interesting to
talk about.
Albert Alschuler: Well, who's against it? And I mean, would the federal judges
support it? Could we say that the informed academic community,
overwhelmingly, supports it? Might if we had a different Justice Department?
Might it be saleable in the Justice Department? Would there be some members of
Congress who would support it? Is it not politically feasible? Who wants to talk
about it?
Frank Bowman: I can respond to that. I think, no Justice Department under any
predictable, or even likely administration that I can think of, would ever be in favor
of Judge Breyer's advisory approach, if what they can have, by contrast, is
anything like the system they've got. I myself would be in favor of this. As a
matter of fact, I said so to the Senate. If it were my choice, I would be in favor of
advisory guidelines. I think it would be, among other things, a tremendously
interesting natural experiment. Even if it wasn't a permanent solution, I'd be all in
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favor of it. But I don't think any line prosecutor's going to want that, at least
relative to what she has now.
David Yellen: I think there is a substantial number of people here and elsewhere
who wouldn't like that nearly as much as a guideline system that was more
structured than advisory guidelines, but with a great deal more flexibility than the
current Federal Guidelines.
Judge Charles Breyer: Well, I mean, I think the standard is one of
reasonableness. The sentencing statute says you must impose a sentence, or you
must impose a sentence that's reasonable to ensure an adequate punishment and so
forth and so on. So I think what you would end up, and this is what my brother
was saying in the argument. He was saying, "Will you have your Courts of
Appeals looking at anything out of the range, out of 'The Heartland'?" Right?
Out of the range. And then looking at the reasons; and then deciding, is that a
reason? Is that reasonable, under the circumstances, to apply the guidelines or to
apply the sentencing factors that particular way?
Joseph Kennedy: The last question. This is an academic question. When I was
listening to you earlier, I got the sense that you were, sort of, a Marvin Frankel
disciple. So then, I was surprised when I heard you say you'd be okay with
advisory guidelines. So my question to you is, if you could've had this system
back, originally, at the time that Frankel made his proposal, would you have
supported it then? Or are your concerns about disparity not as great now, because
we've had a couple of decades of guideline sentencing, and that you, sort of, think
the culture of judging has changed in a way that makes a disparity problem less
serious?
Judge Charles Breyer: I am concerned about disparities occurring without
principled reasons, subject to review for the disparities. And that's my concern.
Let me tell you, I started out as a D.A. And as a D.A., the one part of the job I
really hated was sitting down with the defense lawyer and starting to argue about
how many months. And they're, you know, just four months, eight months, twelve
months. I felt like I was, sort of, in a bazaar. And I thought that I didn't know
what I was talking about, because my idea of four months is different from
somebody else's idea of four months; not well suited for that. So I don't want to
go back to that system, where every judge simply puts on paper whatever they
think is a reasonable sentence under the circumstances; unless you have to give
your reasons for it, and then somebody looks at your reasons and makes a
determination whether those are good reasons from an appellate point of view.
Albert Alschuler: What's clear is the states and every state, that I'm aware of is
much less concerned with the kinds of disparities that result from a moderate
amount of judicial discretion or plea bargaining practices that we heard about.
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Why do you think the states have been so much more accepting of moderate
sentencing variations than at the federal level, where, as I said yesterday, it's
become, I think, sort of a talismanic thing. You know, "Repeal the twenty-five
percent rule? Oh, my gosh! Unwarranted disparity will go through the roofV"
Kevin Reitz: -You're right that the sense of necessity to impose a rigorous
conception of uniformity on sentences in state systems just doesn't exist. At the
state level, there's always been a recognition (and maybe in some of the federal
legislative history there was this philosophy lurking) that no code or sentencing
commission can, in advance, predict all the factual considerations that judges
should be allowed to consider in individual cases. No one is smart enough, in
advance, to do that. The philosophy of uniformity was different in the states than
in the federal system. There was more of a sense that uniformity means we give
judges a starting point, and we'll ask judges to engage in a uniform thought
process that is visible and reviewable when moving away from that starting point.
Departures are not by definition suspect. Most state systems accept that it's a good
thing when judges depart in appropriate cases.
Robert Weisberg: This is a sort of a realpolitik question about political feasibility.
If we're concerned about crude politics, I'm not sure the issue is disparity; the
issue is going to be perceptions of severity. And so it's a question of how that
translates into the baser political instincts. Now before Blakely I, and no doubt
others as well, had started to observe some interesting things happening to
mandatory minimum drug sentences in the states-basically, the potential repeal or
actual repeal in some states, of the Rockefeller-era drug laws. Why? Well, gee,
the states may have even suffered a kind of residual guilty conscience, but to some
extent, it has been a budgetary issue. Another factor is that these repeal efforts are
significantly led by, Republicans or Conservatives; it's a case of "Nixon goes to
China." Then why. are we so worried about Congress? First, is it that the federal
system isn't even susceptible to the kind of budgetary constraints, in terms of the
relative significance of prison budgets in the federal system, as compared to the
state system? Is it that there is simply a strange skewed hyper-incentive for
political demagoguery in the federal system because of something that people
don't realize very much: the federal criminal system doesn't involve that many
criminals but federal legislatures are the most visible legislatures, so they are the
most recklessly indifferent to what they do. It is possible though, that if a Judge
Breyer proposal were framed, and if there's anything to pick up from the spirit of
what's going on in the states and if you also combine it with the fact that crime is
supposed to be down (another factor, which, presumably, has affected the states),
are we too pessimistic about what would happen in Congress? Last twist on this:
Is it that I've got the wrong constituency here? It's not the voters, it's the
prosecutors. In other words, what Congress is going to be responding to is not the
severity concern in the raw sense, but a kind of power concern, so that the real
constituency is the Department of Justice, as it exists at any point.
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Douglas Berman: Rules aren't bad. The safety valve is a rule, and a very, very
good rule, that was passed by Congress that defined a set of circumstances in
which a drug offender ought not get a mandatory minimum sentence. And I don't
think anybody would say that the rule should have been, "Judge, whenever you
think it's not really a bad drug offender, then you can go below the mandatory."
Now, of course, the irony is prosecutors get that rule; it's called 5K 1.1. And they
don't have to articulate why. They get to decide, in a variety of ways, whether it's
by charging or through 5K motions, not to have to articulate. Now, they have a lot
of internal rules, and I'm sure they use their power as properly as a Department of
Justice should, but they're not on the record. They're not subject to rules that have
all the requirements that we care about. And again, that's why I get to the
perspective: It's not rules; it's the kinds of rules that we have. And imagine
another rule that we could've had built into the system that, maybe, is where we
should start. How about that the Sentencing Commission has to turn into a
downward adjustment any factor that more than a thousand federal judges say
ought to be considered at sentencing. So that would mean, you go through the
downward departure statistics, and you say, "Hey, a thousand judges have
downwardly departed for extraordinary family circumstances. We, the Sentencing
Commission, have an obligation to reflect that wisdom and knowledge that maybe
this ought to be considered." And in fact, I think the problem with the
extraordinary family circumstances is that there is no rule. The judges in the
Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit get to do what they want and get to figure out
a way to call it the right thing, and they get to do a departure; and the judges in the
Sixth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit don't get a chance to do that! And if we really
cared about disparity, the Sentencing Commission would be cleaning that up, but
doing it not by, as they did with youthful guidance and all of that, saying, no rule,
no departure. They codify it in a sensible way. The last point is Michael Tonry's
point, which is a great one. He would say, "Keep in mind how much all of this is a
function of our desire to quantify." What can be easily quantified? Imprisonment
levels, drug quantities, amounts of loss, that's what our system's driven by. It's
hard to quantify extraordinary family circumstances. It's hard to quantify aberrant
behavior. It's hard to quantify community service.
Michael Dreeben: Many people have observed that the Sentencing Guidelines
emerged as a surrogate Federal Criminal Code, layered right on top of the
defective structure in Title 18, which was never reformed because Congress could
never muster the political will to do it. There were too many committees that
blocked action on it, and with all the different constituencies fighting over it, it
became a politically untenable project. Yet Judge Breyer's proposal would require
the Congress to do far more. It requires Congress to properly graduate various
crimes and punishments. Given that Congress failed, given a decade to do a
similar project before, what should we think about the actual prospects for
enlightened reform, in a short period of time in a panicked environment after
Booker and Fanfan?
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Susan Klein: I don't think voluntary guidelines are going to work. It might
depend on who drafts them. If we keep the guidelines we have now and just make
them voluntary, then that's not going to work in my opinion. Because over time,
judges will just do whatever they want. Once they get in office, they realize they
don't really have to follow the guidelines; they can't be fired. Your answer of
giving some kind of appeal, I don't think that's going to work because, either, it's
going to be meaningless, right? There's always a reason why I departed from the
guidelines: "I didn't like it. I thought it was too high." Or if you really put bite
into the appeal and you say, "You have to have a reason that follows all the policy
judgments of the guidelines," then you have a Blakely problem, all right? Because
if the guidelines were drafted by Congress, and you get reversed on an appeal for
not following them, that's Blakely. You know, maybe you could have voluntary
guidelines that were created by judges and not created by Congress. Well, if you
did that and then had an appeal and you formed a common law sentencing, would
that be subject to Blakely?
Kate Stith: I am not sanguine about code reform. Reform of the federal code
foundered on seven provisions on which the labor unions and ACLU were opposed
to various other people, and nobody was giving in. And it was a Model Penal
Code kind of thing. It was going to be these very general-and it was brilliant of
Senator Kennedy and other people to say, "Maybe we can bypass this whole thing
by addressing the back end." It just didn't work out well. And so I'm not sure, we
don't have any examples of code reform, except for the Model Penal Code. So I
just think that's a huge project. I think there's another actor here that we've only
talked about in derisive terms, and -that's the Department of Justice. It does seem
to me that is actually the big elephant on the institutional level. And leadership
from the Attorney General and his or her people, and ultimately, that means
presidential leadership. But I think the Department of Justice is obviously the first
step, and the White House stays out of it. And I do think that, with some changes
there, there might be some reforms that are possible. And I have always
considered myself part of the Department of Justice. I would love to see them take
the lead.
Marc Miller: What might academics, what might people interested in policy
reform do? They might write a book. But before you say, "There goes an
academic, again," I'm thinking of a book much of the type that combines the
principals of a Frankel and the policy focus of the "Toward a Just Effective
Sentencing System." What might that book look like? It might be titled, "A More
Perfect System." Not absolutely perfect, but a more perfect system. "Sentencing
Reform After 25 Years of Structured or Guideline Reforms" or "Lessons from the
States," if you wanted to be that explicit and focus on the states and, I think, the
greater intelligence that comes out of them. Introduction, "Constitutional
Moment." We could use that kind of language. But I think this is a policy
moment. I think dramatic changes in policy happen at times of great disruption,
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whatever the source. It can be a dramatic case. It can be something in a
legislature. It can be a case, and for me, that's why I'm intrigued and fascinated,
and I learn a lot by your brilliant exposition of Blakely and how we got there and
the problems. But it concerns me less in the enterprise I'm now discussing. What
would you do? You'd talk about the experiments and lessons from twenty-five
years, celebrate the states up front, celebrate the Sentencing Reform Act, praise
Congress for its original principals and wisdom, with whatever qualifications are
needed. The goal would be to get some very direct, short, readable, clear,
reasonably, widely-supported set of principles that could help to shape the debate.
What would the sections look like? Part One, "Reasonable Consistency:
Avoiding Unwarranted Disparity." There's an opportunity to inform and define
the notion of disparity. You talk about warranted and unwarranted disparity,
uniformity and disparity. Mandatory penalties would have to be up front, part of
this discussion, I think.
Part Two, "Fair Process." What are the fair process principles? You could
call them Due Process, but that clouds it. Fair process principles. "A," notice. Can
I agree? Up front, critical. In my other life, as an environmental natural resources
scholar, habitat conservation plans. No surprises under the Endangered Species
Act. A goal to articulate so people can make reasoned judgments, whether it's
building a hotel or heading off to prison. "B," predictability. You've got to have
reasonable predictability; it's not enough to say you have notice that it can be
anything from zero to twenty. "C," a set of sentencing processes where they
include reasons, whether juries are making judgments, or judges are, or if you have
plea processes, which go to the fourth principle: transparency. It would be very
interesting to raise the issues of prosecutors and plea-bargaining. What about
transparency on screening or declinations or choices? What kind of information
should be revealed? Maybe, you don't touch that here. But it's important over
time.
Part Three, "Articulated Purposes." Here, I think you talk about the purposes
of punishment or justifications. Congress did. They set up the courts and the
Commission to do it. And the Commission, with all due respect, didn't. Let's
leave it there. "Purposes of the System." You articulate the principals or reform.
What are the goals? Again, in relatively general terms, I think you have to
confront this issue of code reform and subset of criminal law. Not so much,
necessarily, as a product of Blakely. Although, maybe, as a product of Blakely.
But because, logically and inevitably, Ron Allen, you and others have made this
sort of point, whereas you have to think about the relationship. Otherwise, there's
this back door and you don't end up confronting the deeper substantive realities. I
think you have to raise the problem of what is the relationship between sentencing
and the problem of crime. You have to, at least, put on the table the possibility that
lawyers, criminal justice systems and sentencing are not the only-and you might
even, if you're being even more honest, say the primary response to the social
issue of crime.
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Four, "Assessment, Knowledge and Adaptation." I think Congress got it right
in the SRA when it made it a knowledge-based system. It said not that knowledge
tells you perfectly what the sentences are (there are value choices, et cetera) but
that sentencing the wide number of cases, the many actors involved and the deep
social principals require certain information. I don't think we've carried that out
particularly well; though the Federal Commission and many state commissions
have done many good things here, it Could be done better. You could talk about a
data panel that required certain kinds of data to be provided, reports, sentencing
information systems. You talked about complexity, and I sure hope we talk about
humility and punishment at some point.
Section Five, "Institutional Variation.", Talk about the rights and
responsibilities, not the constitutional constraints. But logically, the rights and
responsibilities of legislatures, commissions, sentencing judges, where you'd get to
talk about whether you have to have departures in a system to be fair or not.
Appellate judges, parole and review; I think parole and review have to come back
on the table as part of the systems that might work. You cannot ignore
prosecutors.
Part Six, "Our Federal System." It would have three parts. States as Leaders:
You say it up front, you say it during the discussions and you say it, again. "B,"
leave the states alone as best you can. "C," criminal justice is overwhelmingly a
state matter; that is still true in the numbers, even as Congress creates overlapping
offenses and federalizes, and it should be stated as part of a general principal that's
put in front of Congress. Now, how might this be done? Well, first, you'd want a
very good press. You'd want to know that it's going to get in the hands of every
member of Congress, in the hands of state commissions, in the hands of reformers.
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